THEOLOGY

VOL. XLVIII MAY, 1945 No. 299

Editorial

ALMOST every theological book or periodical that is published nowadays contains (i) a misquotation of Lord Acton's dictum about power and (ii) some reference to the "I-Thou" relationship. As regards the former, we began some years ago to collect instances of this misquotation, but they became so numerous and monotonous that we abandoned the enterprise. What Acton said was not "Power always corrupts" nor "All power corrupts" (as contributors to the current issues of two periodicals inform us) but "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men." See *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton* (1904), i. 372, or Lord Acton, *Historical Essays and Studies* (1907), p. 504.

As regards the latter, we should be the last to deny the illumination that is to be derived from this way of thinking. We hope that Martin Buber's *I and Thou* is being widely read and inwardly digested (as evidently it has been by Mr Robinson), and that we are not merely being landed with yet another fashionable theological *cliché*. It ought, however, to be known that Buber was not the originator of this way of thinking, and that it is questionable whether he is its most profound and instructive exponent. He is one representative of a considerable school of modern philosophers on the Continent. Perhaps someone will soon provide English readers with fuller information about it. In any case, it has not of course been left to the twentieth century to discover and reflect upon the difference between personal and impersonal relationships. Nor is the now familiar I and Thou formula so novel as may be supposed. "The 'I' and the 'Thou' stand out confronting each other, making each other intelligible," wrote F. D. Maurice over seventy years ago.[1]

Nevertheless, it is the case that a great deal of important thinking has been done on the Continent in this century, of which only partial echoes have so far reached England. We are not among those who wish to see English theologians and philosophers following at the heels of foreign pioneers. They do better service to the republic of letters and of truth by remaining rooted in their own tradition and by developing their native resources. But the thinkers of each nation ought to reckon with, to understand, and then to assimilate or to reject, what is being thought elsewhere. Much will need to be done in this respect, when communications are reopened after the war, on both sides of the English Channel—and perhaps of the Atlantic Ocean too.

In this connexion, we warmly welcome Professor Hodges' introduction of the work of Wilhelm Dilthey to English readers.[2] Dilthey died as

[1] See *Social Morality*,[2] p. 115; cp. *ibid.*, p. 124; and his lecture "On the word 'I' " in *The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry*.

[2] H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction*. Kegan Paul. 10s. 6d.

long ago as 1911, but he was one of the greatest German philosophers of his time, and, as Professor Hodges says, this introduction is overdue. It is claimed that he was the first philosopher to deal thoroughly and systematically with the difference between our knowledge of physical objects and our knowledge of persons. He showed that, because of this difference, the aims, presuppositions, and methods of the "human studies" and social sciences ought not to be modelled on those of the natural sciences, but ought to correspond to the peculiar character of their subject-matter. He thus challenged the tendency, which is still dominant in England, to treat the methodology of natural science as the norm of every methodology that is entitled to be called scientific. Of course there have been many heartfelt protests against this tendency in the names of art, poetry, and mysticism. It is the merit of Dilthey to have given these protests intellectual substance and precision. He showed that the pursuit of truth is a much more complicated and inconclusive undertaking than has been generally supposed even by intellectuals. Psychology, history, philosophy and sociology, each has its own proper methodology. Thus, Dilthey leads up to the question of the proper methodology of theology, although it lies beyond his purview. If we are to define the exact and peculiar sense in which theology is a science, we shall have to take Dilthey's work into account. Theologians must not be put off by the radical relativism of his thought, nor be in a hurry to affix an opprobrious label to his position.

Agape and Eros

THANKS to the work of Dr Anders Nygren,[1] we have learnt to make a sharp and well-defined distinction between the ideas of *Agape* and *Eros*. *Agape* stands for a love which is essentially divine in quality. It is absolutely "uncaused," in the sense that it is in no way dependent upon the existence of anything lovable outside itself, either for its evocation or its maintenance. It represents a movement away from self, a going out in self-sacrifice for the well-being of an "other," whose perfection is its sole motive. This love is not natural to man: it is supernatural and divine. It can only be shown forth by men in so far as the very love wherewith the Father has loved them in Christ flows through them, being shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost. *Eros*, on the other hand, is just the opposite of all this. It is an attribute of the creature, never of the Creator. It represents an upward movement from man to God. Its fundamental quality is one of yearning, desire, appetition. It is centred in the self, and is the effort to satisfy the hungry soul, and, by possession, to find fulfilment in an "other" of all its aspirations and longings. But this "other" is not an object of interest and concern for its own sake. The reference is always to the self and the satisfaction of its needs, however lofty and spiritual they may be.

The value of this analysis and of the clarification of the essential

[1] *Agape and Eros*, tr. A. G. Hebert.

antithesis involved is very great. Nygren has performed a most valuable service for Christian theology in revealing its central motif and fundamental movement as radically opposed to the categories and content of the Hellenistic and Renaissance religious philosophies with which it has, historically, been so closely involved and so frequently fused. Nevertheless there are points where I am forced to think the analysis too simple and the antithesis too sharp. I say "forced," as natural theological inclination would predispose me to embrace the radical "either—or" between the Hellenic and Hebraic approaches which Nygren indicates. But the evidence of the Bible and of experience informed by it is too compelling. A double modification of Nygren's position seems to be required: neither *Agape* nor *Eros* is as pure and as exclusive of its opposite as he asserts.

In the first place, the element of desire cannot be wholly purged from the notion of *Agape*. It is, indeed, utterly true that *Agape* does not require for its stimulation appreciation of, or desire for, a beauty or goodness external to itself. Again, its springs do not minish or run dry if no response is forthcoming. Whether men hear or whether they forbear, its intensity remains the same—"love never fails." But this in no way excludes the truth that *Agape* desires response, and desires it passionately. It is disinterested in the sense that it bestows its favours on the good and evil alike. It is certainly not disinterested, if by that is meant that it has no concern as to whether its recipients remain good or evil. Love yearns for a loving response. In this sense there is a need in the very heart of God, a divine discontent which must ever burn until it be satisfied. He has made us for Himself, and His heart is restless till we find our rest in Him.

This brings us at once to extremely disputed and dangerous ground. The chasm of Impassibility lies at our feet. Into it I do not propose to step here. This doctrine, with its endless implications alike for metaphysics and religion, may well prove to be the key-point of the theological battle which will be necessary before Hebraism can make good its right to provide as adequate a medium of expression for a Christian philosophy as Hellenism, and "thelematology" prove itself as fruitful in its categories as the "ontology" of Thomism. But here these tempting avenues must be shunned. Suffice it to say that the recognition of an element of desire in *Agape* is nowhere denied, but always assumed, both in the Old and New Testaments. "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, my compassions are kindled together"[1]—this is the picture of God's love for His people given in the prophets. So it is also His who claimed to send the prophets: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not."[2] This is the love which yearns for the return of the prodigal, the love which seeks and finds, and having found bears home rejoicing. This joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth cannot be understood unless unfulfilled desire is in some sense a reality even for God.

[1] Hosea xi, 9. [2] Mt. xxiii, 37.

Thus there exists even within the Divine *Agape* an element which Nygren would appropriate exclusively to *Eros*. Similarly, a closer analysis of human love reveals qualities which are inexplicable if his account of *Eros* is adequate. I am not thinking here of that kind of human love which the Greeks called *Philia* (friendship), and which Nygren strangely ignores in his efforts to make the antithesis between *Agape* and *Eros* complete. Rather, I believe it is possible, and indeed necessary, to see even within that relationship which is the type of all *Eros*, the love between a man and a woman, elements which seriously disrupt the simple framework within which Nygren's discussion moves.

Now, it is not disputed that there are some forms of sexual relationship that may be completely described in terms of Nygren's definition of *Eros*. The love concerned may be entirely centred in the self, interested in the "other" solely as providing satisfaction for its spiritual or physical needs. But this is surely a debasement of the true relationship between man and woman, rather than its norm. It is a case of what Buber would describe as an "I-It" relationship—a relationship where the "other" is merely a "piece" of my world, a point on the ever widening circumference of the circle of self-expansion. It is not in any true sense a personal relationship at all. For though its object is another self, it might equally well be a thing, if such could be found which would give similar satisfaction. The mark of the peculiarly personal is absent. The "other" is no "Thou" existing in its own right and exercising upon me a claim of its own, which proceeds from a completely different centre from myself, and in obedient response to which a relationship of reciprocal loving communion alone becomes possible.

Now, if this is true—if what Nygren describes by *Eros* is a debased form of another relation—is it possible to analyse more exactly the content of this "proper" "I-Thou" relationship, as it finds expression in the love between a man and a woman? This is a task which requires a delicacy of perception and a maturity of experience given to few. But it is perhaps possible to single out two elements or moments in such a relationship which may carry us a certain distance.

In the first place, none of the richness of fruition which Nygren attributes to *Eros* is here excluded. In such a relationship there may be present in fullest degree the sense of that affirmation of being, that fulfilment of longing and aspiration, that liberating finding of self in another, which has always been regarded as the mark of this sort of love. There is no need to minimize anything that can be said under this head. Yet, in the very act of this unlimited expansion of personality, there is another movement—one of imperious constriction and limitation by the personality of an "other" standing over against the Ego. A man is at once aware of the exclusiveness and inescapability of a claim upon his whole being, utterly forbidding anything that would force or infringe the freedom and independence of the personal will which confronts him. This presents an absolute "No" to the other movement of affirmation and fulfilment. Even the keenest desires and most passionate aspirations here come to a halt. No man who really loves a woman could deliberately put her in such a position that her

SHERBROOK LIBRARY

acceptance of him or of his will, however urgently desired, was in any degree forced. It is because of this that this relationship, while it provides the highest form of fruition and self-realization, also occasions some of the greatest acts of unselfishness of which man is capable. The "other" in whom I find myself, so far from appearing to exist purely for my pleasure and satisfaction, exercises a claim on me so independent and autonomous as to require, it may be, the surrender even of my life itself.

Such an analysis of the love-relationship makes it clear that we are here quite outside the limits within which Nygren chooses to discuss *Eros*. Of this second movement of absolute constriction by the claims of another, to which the only response is one of utter obedience and unselfishness—of this he says nothing. Once again his account of the antithesis between *Agape* and *Eros* errs through over-simplification. Just as it fails to explain the movement towards self—namely, the desire for response, which exists in *Agape*—so it fails to explain the movement away from self, that of obedience and sacrifice, which we have found in *Eros*.

By way of bringing out the complex character of the nature of Christian love, the true *Agape*, it may be useful to conclude with an examination of the idea of our love for God. This idea presents itself as somewhat of an embarrassment to Nygren. For, on the one hand, the Biblical word is *Agape*: *Eros* is never found in the pages of the N.T. Yet an essential quality of *Agape* is that it is "uncaused," neither evoked nor requiring to be evoked by anything outside itself. But this can never be true of our love for God, which is always and essentially a response to God's love for us. It is continuously evoked by the awareness of His goodness and lovingkindness, in creation, preservation and all the blessings of this life, but above all in the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ. Now, in the case of the Christian's *Agape* for his neighbour, it is possible to trace signs of the divine quality of love for the unlovable, even though it must remain a responsive rather than a self-initiated love. But in our love for God there cannot be any idea that what we love is not the supremely fitting object of our highest adoration and the complete satisfaction of our deepest cravings; nor can there be any suggestion that the reason for our love is anything other than the fact that He is just these very things.

Nygren's solution is somewhat vacillating. On the one hand, he admits that, according to the Synoptists, our Lord Himself employs the word *Agape* to designate the nature of our response to the Divine love. And he cannot but retain the use of the word. It is, however, a usage which does not at all easily fit in with his definition of *Agape*. There seems no doubt that, if the evidence would permit him, he would like to cease to speak of *Agape* towards God altogether. This preference is exhibited in his relative assessment of St Paul and St John. The former he regards as having seen the difficulty in question and as having, therefore, deliberately preferred *Pistis* to *Agape* as a description of the true relation of man to God. This he claims as the deepest insight on the matter in the N.T.; and he notes in consequence a falling off from the purity of the Christian idea of *Agape* in the Johan-

nine writings. But this can hardly be considered a satisfactory conclusion. It is difficult to imagine that St Paul ever intended the idea of faith to be a substitute for that of love when the object of apprehension was God. Certainly in 1 Cor. xiii it is precisely *love* which alone "abides" when direct awareness of God is established and is therefore the characteristic quality of this as of every Christian relationship. And it does seem a bit arbitrary to discredit the evidence of that N.T. author who above all has earned the title of the Apostle of Love, by detecting in him the first signs of the coming Silver Age. When all is said, the first great commandment remains with us, and if it cannot be fitted into one definition of what *Agape* must mean, then it is so much the worse for that definition.

It is an essential feature of the "I-Thou" relationship that it is characterized by what Buber calls "*Gegenseitigkeit*," or reciprocity. We have seen that the idea of *Agape* even in God contains within it a yearning for a response. Now the nature of this human response must necessarily differ in many respects from the original divine Word of love. And chiefly it must differ in that the divine *Agape* is the creative Word—it bestows value by the very act of loving: except as the object of God's love no finite being has any worth or loveliness. Our love, on the other hand, is necessarily a responsive word, and consists in the recognition rather than the creation of value.

Nevertheless, the differences must not be stressed to the exclusion of the similarities. After all, the N.T. sees fit, humanly incredible as it may seem, to use the same term both of God's Word and of our response. The command of Christ to us is to love with the *Agape* wherewith He has loved us. It will be said that this has reference to the fulfilment of the second great commandment rather than the first. In the case of our neighbour it is indeed possible, by God's grace, to enter into the ministry of reconciliation upon which the divine Love is engaged. It is our high privilege as Christians to exercise a degree of that creative *Agape* which bestows value on the unlovable, dies for the sinner, and turns evil to good. But all this, we are reminded, is inapplicable when the object of our love is not sinful humanity, but God.

But this objection rests upon too rigid a divorce of love of God from love of neighbour. Fulfilment of the second commandment may not be synonymous with that of the first, but it is at least included and presupposed in it. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar."[1] And, conversely, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me."[2] Divine creative *Agape* for the neighbour is possible to men just because it is an expression of, and part of, a love for God which is itself *Agape* and not *Eros*. Yet *Agape* towards God is, on Nygren's definition, strictly inadmissible. This suggests that here again *Agape* must be redefined in such a way as to include elements which Nygren would confine solely to *Eros*. This additional inclusion we have also found to be necessary in treating of God's love for men. Moreover, our examination of the typically *Eros* relationship has led us to find in it what can only be called the

[1] 1 Jn. iv, 20. [2] Mt. xxv, 40.

Agape element of self-oblation. On the basis of these facts, is it possible to state more clearly the essential nature of the love-relationship of man to God?

By using the idea of the "I-Thou" relationship to describe a man's relation both to the finite and the infinite in his environment, Buber in fact asserts a fundamental identity of structure between the two. Whatever the differences, there is an essential formal continuity in a way a person relates himself to the "Thou's" of finite existence (represented most explicitly, though by no means exclusively, by other persons) and the manner of his meeting with God, the eternal "Thou." This assertion may most conveniently be established by reference back to our previous analysis of the love-relationship between a man and a woman. The use of this particular analogy is thoroughly Biblical. The N.T. idea of the Bride of Christ is only an extension of the familiar prophetic comparison of the relation of God to His people with the marriage bond, elaborated most fully in Hosea i-iii.

Analysis of this marriage relationship revealed in it a double movement. The plenitude of fulfilment is present only in the total constriction of self-will which respect for the inviolability of the other's personality involves. These cannot be regarded as successive moments, as though an initial self-giving were rewarded by an ultimate self-fulfilment, or as though it were a question of self-realization to a certain limit and self-sacrifice thereafter. The two are inseparable aspects of a single experience. They are so fused that each seems to be true only in and because of the other, rather than as well as and despite it.

Now it is not difficult to see the close parallel between this paradoxical experience and that which has always been recognized as true of the relationship to Him "whose service is perfect freedom." *Cui servire regnare est.* That is the basic fact of experience enshrined in the description of the "Thou" relationship to God as the single awareness of One who is at the same time both Absolute Demand and Final Succour. The essential structural identity of this awareness of God with the human relationship of personal trust and love has been worked out by Dr Farmer in the first chapter of his *World and God.* All that requires to be stressed here is its continuity even with that which is always regarded as the very type of the specifically *Eros* relation.

The conclusion that has forced itself upon us is that the relation of *Agape* and *Eros*, of Grace and Nature, is not that of the simple antithesis which Nygren describes. There are elements of *Eros* in *Agape*, and *vice versa.* This suggests that the true definition of *Agape* is not to be reached merely by saying "No" to *Eros* and everything natural. Rather, to use Professor Niebuhr's formula, we may see the one as the "completion," the "clarification" and the "correction" of the other. What precisely these processes involve cannot be examined here. This has been sufficiently done by Niebuhr himself.[1] "Correction" there must be: the Roman Catholic conception of the relation of Grace to Nature as mere "completion" is too simple. But neither will *Agape* be understood or learnt by a simple denial of *Eros.* As Buber succinctly puts it, with reference to Kierkegaard's situation, "It is God's will that

[1] *The Nature and Destiny of Man,* Vol. II, Ch. III.

we should come to Him through the Regines He has made, and not by breaking with them".[1] This does not mean that detachment and renunciation are not required of the Christian. Any particular "Thou" may become a *skandalon* at any time, barring rather than mediating the approach of the infinite "Thou." But it does mean that the *Agape* and *Eros* relationships are not absolutely and essentially opposed, but that in structure they are similar. The response to the divine Word may genuinely be given in and through response to the word of a woman. That possibility is indeed the only basis for a Christian doctrine of marriage. It is if and when I become aware "that I cannot make my answer to the life-long address of God to me, unless I answer at the same time for the other too,"[2] that marriage becomes a possibility before God and a duty.

It is not, of course, suggested that there is any necessary connexion between *Agape* and *Eros*. The relation between the sexes is, after all, only one form of "natural" love, and not the most universal: the vocation to marriage only comes to some. Moreover, it is not the most unambiguous expression of the archetypal divine *Agape*: the father-child relationship is the analogy preferred by Christ. But to insist on a complete discontinuity between the two kinds of love is to distort the nature of each and in consequence to damage the Christian doctrine both of man and of God. On the one hand, it debases the relationship between man and woman to something which is difficult to recognize as part of the divine order of creation. It gives theological sanction to a purely self-centred, "Hollywood" version of "love," by implying that it is all that can be expected of the natural man. *Eros* is thus understood so as to make it impossible to conceive it as representing the creation of, or mediating the response to, the divine Word of *Agape*. On the other hand, God's *Agape*, together with its reflection in human neighbour-love, is stripped of its warmth and reduced to a cold charity. Its object is indeed the true well-being of all men alike; but it is not that undying zeal for their perfection, whose consuming concern is for love returned and whose only rest the restoration of the hundredth sheep.

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON.

WESTCOTT HOUSE,
CAMBRIDGE.

A Neglected Page in Anglican Theology

ANGLICANISM, though different from Lutheranism and Calvinism, is like them a product of the Reformation, and shares with the other members of the Reformation family the lack of an ascetic theology. From the Protestant point of view this is a merit, from the Catholic point of view it is a defect, but either way the fact is beyond doubt. *Cf.* the Homily on Salvation, which is entirely devoted to an account of justification, as if that and salvation were the same. Anglicanism has nothing to set against the rich tradition of Catholic ascetic theology except Jeremy Taylor and William Law. Anglicans who are keenly

[1] *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*, 34. [2] Ib., 51.

interested in the subject are forced to follow the Latin sources, with the result that they often forget what the Reformation really achieved.

Methodism in the hands of the Wesleys was a root from which a native Anglican ascetic theology might have grown. Methodism is not one of the great Reformation systems, and it differs from them not only in date but also in character. It is not and does not include a distinctive system of dogmatics; it accepts the dogmatic theology of the Church of England and undertakes to add to it a theory of spiritual growth and a discipline in conformity with the theory.

Although in so doing it draws heavily on Protestant sources, the underlying intention is not in accord with the spirit of the Reformation and even amounts to a reaction against it. In this it may be compared with Quakerism, though unlike Quakerism it did not drop the Reformation truths, but accepted them sincerely while combining them with its own. This midway position has constantly been recognized by Methodists and others. John Wesley himself was clear about it. Methodists today are often conscious of Catholic affinities. The system has been described as "an original and unique synthesis of the Protestant ethic of grace with the Catholic ethic of holiness."

There are two key points—*viz.*, *justification*, where Methodism reaffirms the Lutheran and Pauline doctrine, and *perfection*, where Methodism breaks with Protestant principles and adopts the Catholic ideal. On both points the doctrine is based mainly on the Bible as verified and interpreted by experience.

1. *Justification.*—John Wesley's teaching in Oxford and in Georgia was a premature Tractarianism, high, harsh, and rubric-bound, but already the ascetic leaven was at work. He had learned from Jeremy Taylor that the goal of Christian attainment is to walk in perfectness, as a friend of God, and that the way to this is by total self-devotion, by making every thought and deed a sacrifice to God. Wesley set himself to follow this road, and he went about it by means of a busy program of good works, accompanied by frequent and rigorous self-examination, expecting thus to overcome sin, to grow in grace and virtue, and in short to live the Christian life. He was hampered and frustrated, however, by a constant anxiety, which showed itself partly in a great fear of death and partly in the consciousness of the burden of "unforgiven" sin. He had grown up to think of forgiveness as meaning acquittal at the Judgment—*i.e.*, an event in the future, made possible for us by the work of Christ on the Cross, and to which, if we fulfil the conditions by living according to the Christian law and trusting in Christ, we may look forward with a hope never wholly unmixed with apprehension. Wesley knew enough of his own heart to keep the apprehension well to the fore, with a consequent paralysis of moral effort.

Then came his contact with the Moravians, from whom he learned that forgiveness is not a future possibility but a present reality. The well-grounded Christian does not believe *that* Christ *is* the Saviour of *mankind*, he believes *in* Christ *as his own* Saviour; does not vaguely trust that finally the merits of Christ may avail for him personally, but knows that they do so now. This is called "having an interest in" Christ—an "interest" in the sense of a legal right or claim on which

one can boldly take one's stand. Indeed, it brings with it a boldness or freedom in approaching the presence of God (the Johannine παρρησία), together with peace of mind and power over sin. And all this is wrought in the soul through "faith." It was evident that Wesley had not this "faith."

After much seeking and prayer it came to him in his "evangelical conversion" in May, 1738, of which he has recorded the symptoms and abiding results: the replacement of anxious striving by complete and confident trust; the lifting of the burden of guilt and fear; a new sense of the nearness of God; new insight into spiritual things; new power over sin; peace of mind. It is the same experience which had previously determined Luther's course, and which long before had received its classical expression in the Epistle to the Romans. The doctrine of justification by faith is simply the theoretical analysis of it.

Wesley in his attempts to describe it is prodigal of phrases and images, drawn from many sources, and some of them raising serious issues. Besides forgiveness and justification he calls it regeneration or the new birth; a new creation; the restoration of the divine image in the soul; the bestowal on it of the mind that was in Christ; the return of the soul to unity; the drawing aside of the veil; adoption and sonship. He says that it is normally accompanied or followed closely by the full assurance (πληροφορία) of faith, or witness of the Spirit that we are the sons of God. These are mostly figurative expressions. What real fact lies behind them?

I suggest this. When we first begin to try to live the Christian life our efforts are awkward and uncoördinated, and for a long time they make little visible impression on the mass of evil in us. This is the period of frustration. The effect, however, is cumulative, and shows itself at last in a shifting of the balance of the personality. A life which had been centred on itself and its own desires and efforts (not necessarily bad ones) comes instead to be centred on its relation to Christ, a relation of trust and loyalty—*i.e.*, "faith." On the nature of this "faith" Wesley quotes the Homily on Salvation, where it is defined as a "sure trust and confidence in God, that by the merits of Christ (our) sins be forgiven, and (we) reconciled to the favour of God." The natural psychological consequences of this would be as described by Wesley.

For Protestantism this faith-relation is the end of Christian growth, but for Wesley it is only the beginning. At first he greatly overdid this, declaring that before his conversion he had not been a Christian at all, and had not possessed saving faith. Later he held that in this first period he had had the faith of a servant, which at his conversion was replaced by the faith of a son. This is suggestive and psychologically true, and it implies that even the pre-conversion period was an integral part of his Christian life, though an immature one. In fact the great aim of Christian aspiration—*i.e.*, perfection—had captured his mind very early, and his conversion did nothing to alter this aim; what it did was to set him free to pursue it without the burden of anxiety.

2. *Perfection.*—The doctrine that there is such a thing as Christian perfection and that it can be attained in this life is open to so many abuses that the very sound of the word arouses negative reactions in

many minds. Wesley knew the dangers, but he saw that both the idea and the word are solidly embedded in Scripture. W. E. Sangster (*The Path to Perfection*, pp. 37 *ff.*) has listed 30 passages in the Bible to which Wesley appeals, and in which perfection is set forth both as a divine command and as a promise. Shall we be wiser than the Holy Ghost?

But wherein does Christian perfection consist, and by what stages is it reached?

The immediate result of conversion, according to Wesley, is a period of light, joy, and peace, in which the power of sin is for the moment restrained and may seem to have been permanently broken. This period, which may be quite short, is followed by a growth of insight into oneself and a new vision of the extent and malice of "inbred sin." This sin, indeed, no longer puts a barrier between us and God; for the justified there is no more condemnation. But the sin is still there, and we are still unable to root it out by our own power. We lament it and pray for deliverance. Justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, we still need and long to be sanctified by His righteousness increasingly imparted to us.

> Thy righteousness is counted mine:
> When will it in my nature shine?

This period of waiting and longing may be marked by a certain darkness, bewilderment, and discouragement. Wesley seems to have known little, and that inaccurately, of the Catholic literature on the night of the soul; but he knew certain ideas which were current in pietist circles, and in his sermons on *The Wilderness State* and on *Heaviness through Manifold Temptations* he made his own attitude clear. He holds that the darkness, however common in fact, is still an unnatural phenomenon in the sense that it is always in some way a result of sin; and that it is never so dark as to obliterate faith, hope, love, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. These are the constant marks of the indwelling Christ, who lives and works in us as the light amid the darkness, until at last the darkness is dispelled and we are perfected in Him.

> More and more Thyself display,
> Shining to the perfect day.

What is this perfection towards which we are led? It is simply and solely love, and Wesley often replaces the abstract term "perfection" by the more explicit phrase "perfect love." This phrase should be full of meaning for Anglicans, who begin every Eucharist with the prayer "that we may perfectly love Thee." And what is perfect love? It is, Wesley tells us, a "will steadily and uniformly devoted to God," a spirit so dedicated that it never swerves or is distracted by any private wish from the one aim of its life.

> O hide this self from me, that I
> No more, but Christ in me may live.
> My vile affections crucify,
> Nor let one darling lust survive.
> In all things nothing may I see,
> Nothing desire or seek, but Thee.

But it is impossible to love God without also loving the brethren. No theme is commoner in Charles Wesley's hymns than this of the mutual love of Christians within the Church, and it is significantly called "the bond of perfectness." Love of God reflecting itself in love of the brethren: it is simply the Johannine Gospel taken in all seriousness. We are to show our discipleship in the way indicated by the Christ of the Last Supper discourse.

> While we walk with God in light,
> God our hearts doth still unite;
> Dearest fellowship we prove,
> Fellowship in Jesu's love:
> . . . . . .
> Hence may all our actions flow,
> Love the proof that Christ we know;
> Mutual love the token be,
> Lord, that we belong to Thee.

Orthodox Protestantism cannot easily come to terms with this. Holding as it does that the ground on which man stands before God is faith and faith alone, it suspects all doctrines of love or holiness as tending to lay another foundation than that which is laid. That is how Zinzendorf reacted to Wesley himself: *Christus est sola perfectio nostra. Qui perfectionem inhærentem sequitur, Christum denegat. . . . Omnis Christiana perfectio est fides in sanguine Christi. Est tota Christiana perfectio imputata, non inhærens.* Modern writers in the Reformation tradition run true to form. Note, however, that (*a*) Wesley does not make perfection imply faultlessness. It is incompatible with conscious and deliberate sin, but the imperfections and even corruptions of our fallen nature still remain. Pride, fanaticism, or negligence can survive even in the perfect. (*b*) Those who reach perfection remain, to the end of their lives, capable of falling away. (*c*) Perfect love is itself based on faith. It is not achieved by effort, but is given in a moment, like faith itself, in answer to prayer.

Can we make sense of a perfection which (*a*) comes not by degrees, but all in a moment, and yet (*b*) leaves us still grievously imperfect and capable of relapse? I think we can. "Perfect" need not mean faultless; it can mean full-grown. The oak may be stunted and mutilated, but yet by the very fact of being an oak it is perfect in a sense in which the best of acorns is imperfect. So Christian perfection may be simply the maturity of the Christian life. This agrees well with the meaning of τέλειος. And what would be the mark of such maturity? If we look back at our account of the nature of conversion, we may get a hint. In conversion, we suggested, a personality hitherto centred on itself and its own aims comes to be centred on its faith-relation with Christ. Can we not conceive a further change whereby the self drops out of sight altogether and the personality is centred on God simply as God? The faith-relation would still be there and would be the foundation of all, but it would no longer fill the centre of consciousness. Such a change, however long prepared, might manifest itself suddenly and surprisingly, like its predecessor.

John Wesley himself associates perfection with growing up to the full stature of Christ, and Charles writes much about the building up of the Body and of ourselves as members of it. Much of the biblical evidence is satisfied by this interpretation, but perhaps not all. There remain passages which speak of the Christian as being "cleansed from all unrighteousness," or "from all defilement of flesh and spirit," and of a Church "without spot or wrinkle, holy and without blemish." Wesley, who had no belief in a purgation after death, was forced to see here the promise of something more drastic even than "perfection" in the qualified sense in which he uses this word. I will not discuss this complex question further than to indicate its effect on Wesley's doctrine of perfection, which it undoubtedly influenced for good. It led him to insist that perfection, like justification, is not an end but a beginning, and that there is no finality of attainment for anyone in this life. He thus escaped one of the greatest dangers attending on perfectionist doctrines.

Finish then Thy new creation,
Pure and spotless let us be;
Let us see Thy great salvation,
Perfectly restored in Thee;
Changed from glory into glory,
Till in heaven we take our place.

3. *Problems and Implications.*—(*a*) Wesley may be substantially right in his description of the course of spiritual growth, and yet wrong in his choice of technical terms. He raises serious difficulties by identifying conversion with regeneration or the new birth. Anglican doctrine, based on the Bible, undeniably connects regeneration with Baptism, and not as a delayed effect, but as one which takes place before the end of the Baptismal service. Wesley knew this, of course, and his attempt to get round it (in the sermon on *The New Birth*) is disingenuous. Moreover, the Bible unquestionably connects Baptism with remission of sins; yet Wesley, who identifies forgiveness with justification, connects them (or it) with conversion.

I have no doubt that Wesley is wrong about regeneration, but on the matter of forgiveness and justification there is something to be said for him. Forgiveness may mean two things. It may mean remission of penalties or disabilities, and in that sense of course a baptized person, even an infant, has remission; he is relieved of the grave disability of alienation from the commonwealth of Israel, he is brought within the covenant and made an heir of its promises, and he receives grace in such kind and degree as is appropriate to his age and state. But forgiveness may also mean the ending of a personal estrangement, and how can that happen without both parties being aware of it? However benevolent the offended party may be, there is some sense in saying that the offender is not effectively forgiven until he knows he is. Now, it is precisely this knowledge which comes, through faith, in conversion. If so, conversion deserves all the emphasis which Wesley lays upon it, and people should be taught to look forward to it as the fulfilment of what is promised but only half executed in Baptism. Such teaching would be in place both before and after Confirmation, and most especially in

connexion with that rite; though it would be a mistake, for various reasons, to link the experience of conversion with the rite of Confirmation too closely or too exclusively. For Catholics there also arises the problem of relating the steady consciousness of justification to the periodic absolutions which are part of the Catholic discipline. Is it too daring to suggest that the Roman insistence on frequent absolution and the teaching often given in connexion with it are the natural result of a theology which has forgotten the very meaning of justification and a discipline which does not naturally lead towards it? But I will not pursue this farther.

(*b*) Wesley's doctrine of perfection has striking affinities, at times amounting to identity, with the Catholic doctrine as set forth by such writers as Harton. More: closer examination shows a parallelism between Wesley's theology of the spiritual life as a whole and the old Catholic doctrine of the threefold way. The early stage where the pilgrim has the faith of a servant but not yet that of a son is certainly the purgative way. The symptoms of the period following conversion agree with those of the illuminative way, chequered by elements of the dark night. The state of the perfect is clearly the unitive way.

The parallelism is undesigned and indeed unconscious. Wesley did not draw much from Catholic sources, and he could not have reached the point he did if he had. Catholic influence would have set him right about the new birth, and would have clarified his language about the purgative and the unitive ways and the night of the soul; but it would almost certainly have prevented him from understanding the nature and importance of conversion as he did. This doctrine of conversion is his greatest single merit. Taken in its context it is not merely a true understanding of Reformation teaching, such as many another has had, but an integration of it with Catholic tradition, where it fills an unrecognized gap. Protestant suspicion and Catholic pride may prevent this from being admitted. Yet the absence from the Catholic tradition of any clear account of conversion may well reflect not so much the truth of things as a defect in the Catholic regimen. More in general it may be urged that the Catholic tradition is too much conditioned by scholastic philosophy and cloistered piety, and that there is something to be said for a fresh approach to the subject, based on the Bible and a different kind of experience.

Wesley's work is not a finished achievement, but a beginning which ought to have been followed up. It was made by an Anglican who never knowingly departed from the doctrine of his Church, but who tried to enrich its life by borrowing wisdom from Germany. The neglect, or rather the widespread ignorance, of it in Anglican circles shows how great is the gap between the pretensions of the Bridge-Church and its actual performance.

H. A. Hodges.

Reading.

BOOK REVIEWS

LIVING WORSHIP. By David G. Peck. The Archbishop of Canterbury's Lent Book for 1945. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 4s. 6d.

WORSHIP AND THE COMMON LIFE. By Eric Hayman. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE SACRAMENTS. By W. B. Monahan. Baylis. 10s. 6d.

THE CHRISTIAN SACRIFICE. By Eugene Masure. Translated by Dom Illtyd Trethowan. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 15s.

The four books under review, in the order named, present, in an increasing sharpness of focus, the interrelation between the sociological and liturgical problems of our time. The first is by an Anglican, and its analysis covers the widest field in the shortest compass. The second owes much to the author's association with the Society of Friends and is mainly concerned with the problem of community. The third is a paraphrase of Thomist teaching on the Sacraments, with the exception of the Eucharist, which is contained in a separate volume. It provides a useful introduction to Aquinas, and offers a catholic yardstick by which to measure Hayman's essential thesis of the sacramental articulation of community life (*cf.* pp. 9 and 88). The fourth is by a Roman Catholic, and offers the clearest delineation of sacrifice as the directed response of the creation to the Creator (*cf.* p. 42).

Peck and Hayman begin with a discussion of the contemporary divorce between religion and life which makes worship appear to be an irrelevant activity for modern man. Peck maintains that this divorce has occurred because social life is becoming increasingly formless, while worship is an essentially formal activity. This argument is worked out with great skill in demonstrating the way in which worship provides the true pattern for man's use of the different orders of the natural creation, the manipulation of which is the source of his economic problems, a nexus of his social relationships, and the material basis of his culture (ch. 3). The argument is then carried forward to show worship as the authentic pattern of man's personal and social life according to God's purpose (ch. 4). It is a most satisfying and readable book, and is one of the best introductions to the type of Christian social thinking associated with *Christendom* that has yet appeared. Its chief weakness is a certain lack of proportion. The bulk of the book is taken up with sociological analysis which is both valuable and salutary, but within this the reference to worship tends to be incidental. When a new edition is called for the publishers would be well advised to let the author incorporate a final chapter by way of formal commentary on the Church's liturgical life to demonstrate the concrete expression of his argument.

Hayman takes up the theme of the sociological problem, and argues that the integration between religion and life can only be achieved by a "total worship" which "relates all the affairs of the common life to one centre from which they all derive their meaning, their purpose,

their interrelationship and their order" (p. 3). It is encouraging to see how close to the Catholic tradition Hayman has come from his Quaker premisses in stating the relationship between the natural and supernatural forms of community, each of which presupposes and demands the other as its inevitable complement and corollary. There are "two realizations of community—and neither of them may be rejected, nor merely be subordinated one to the other. For in both the divine purpose may be traced, and both arise from the apparent divine intention for human life. We have seen them as the natural and supernatural community. . . . If it be natural, the natural must be confronted continually by the supernatural" (pp. 81-2).

When Hayman proceeds to discuss the specific nature of the supernatural community, and the rationale or pattern of total worship in which the relation and fruitful tension between the two forms of community is expressed and maintained, his treatment is less satisfactory. It is at this point that we may turn to Monahan's exposition of Aquinas to understand how the life of the Church is articulated in her sacraments of organic structure and growth, making clear the way in which each one of the great moments and needs of the natural life is counterpointed and woven within the texture of the supernatural. But above all we must turn to Masure for his magnificent exposition of the rationale of sacrifice.

The Christian Sacrifice is a book to which it is difficult to do justice in a composite review. The priest is advised to buy it, to read it and to live with it, since it is the kind of theology from which the true nourishment and illumination of devotion flow. It will be the source not only of a renewed understanding of the central act of his own ministry but also of much valuable teaching for his people.

The book falls into three parts. The first is concerned with the general theory of sacrifice, which it regards as a transfer of property from man to God, and its return to God in two stages: "Sacrifice is a sensible sign (or rite) in which under the symbols (or species) of a victim, man, to pay his dues to God and so to realize his end, bears witness that he renounces sin which is his evil (immolation), and that he turns to God who is his good (oblation)—hoping that the divine acceptance, sanctifying his offering, will win for him the heavenly alliance at which he aims and that the victim will bring him by communion the guarantee of it" (p. 78). The second part deals with the Sacrifice of Christ, and its two sections discuss respectively the Mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption. This analysis of the union of the two Natures in the One Person is a necessary preliminary to the discussion of the two stages of the Son's return to the Father and the perfection of Christ's Sacrifice. From this perspective it is possible for Masure to show the centrality of the Mass in the Christian religion, how the Incarnation leads up to it, explains it, and is itself further explained by it. The last part of the book is devoted to the Sacrifice of the Mass. Here the discussion of Eucharistic tradition, the nature of the Church's Sacrifice in the Mass, and the commentary on the common prayers of the Roman Mass are the most valuable features. It is here, illuminated against this rich background, that we see by

comparison the weakness of Hayman's account of the Church's central act of worship. One would like to say more, but those who read will say it in their thoughts and prayers. "To speak of the sacrifice of our Head would be to bring within a single phrase all the teaching of this book, in which Jesus our victim has been shown to us at the centre of the Eucharistic action, as we had first gazed upon Him on the Cross at Calvary, animating the vast body of the Church and even that of all humanity with His all-powerful religious energy . . ." (p. 282).

R. H. Daubney.

Richmond.

The Calling of God. By M. A. C. Warren. Lutterworth Press. 6s.

In 1943 Dr Warren was asked to lecture at a Vacation School of Biblical Study at Oxford, and this slim volume is the result. It is written in an admirable spirit of serenity and objectivity with great learning which does not obtrude itself. He accepts the fact that the missionary work of the Church is under a cross-fire of attack from those within as well as from without, and he finds here cause for exhilaration rather than dismay. In an age of reconstruction much will have to be adapted, and it is important to realize the good in what has been handed down to us as well as what is bad. Dr Warren is anxious that his natural enthusiasm for the propagation of the faith should not in any way impair his historical judgment. It is not a sin to prove something true; it is only a sin when we "cook" our proof to accommodate our interest or hope.

The result is to be found in these four essays which provide an admirable prolegomena to the study of the Mission and Expansion of Christianity which should find a greater place both in the teaching of our colleges and in parochial preaching.

The first essay is an attempt to trace the missionary vocation of the Church "From Abraham to Augustine," and a reminder that there is no break in continuity between the Old Israel and the New. "Augustine watching the dissolution of the Hellenic Roman civilization of his day could write of that same city whose quest had inspired Abraham." The two following essays call attention to two fundamental tensions within the Church: (1) the tension of unity with the one and community, of the "I-Thou" relationship and that of the "Many." This essay is clearly much influenced by Martin Buber. It is a valuable treatment of the tension between the individualistic and social implications of the Church. The third essay deals with (2) the "other historical tension," and is headed "Cæsar—the Beloved Enemy." This discusses the manner in which social, economic and cultural factors have often both made the mission of the Church possible and then created conditions for its frustration. This too is a felicitous treatment of some aspects of the relation of Church and State; a problem which is revealing new complications in countries like India and Japan.

The last essay—The Missionary Task of the Church—takes up the theme of the first, and enlarges on the law "of specialization of

function" by which the mission has been carried out in successive ages. There is something generic in the history of monasticism, of Benedict and Boniface, the cells of Columba and the work of the Friars, the mission of the Moravians and Wesley, the missionary societies of the evangelical revival and the religious orders.

The world changes but spiritual principles remain unchanged. "The response of faith by which the Church was born and by which it has since expanded . . . is something which cannot in the last analysis be regimented; it is the result of an 'inspired spontaneity'."

LEONARD M. SCHIFF.

SPENNYMOOR.

THE BOOK OF THE DISCIPLINE (*Vinaya-Pitaka*). Vol. III (*Suttavibhanga*). Translated by I. B. Horner. Humphrey Milford. 10s. 6d.

The sacred literature of primitive Buddhism falls into three groups, dealing respectively with (*a*) Monastic discipline, (*b*) The Buddhist Message, and (*c*) More advanced discussion. Miss Horner in this volume of the Sacred Books of the Buddhists has furnished a translation of a section of the first group, expounding the rules of the Buddhist Order. This work completes the earlier translations of the *Suttavibhanga* by Miss Horner, to whom students of Buddhism are greatly indebted for valuable material throwing light on the daily life of the recluses. During Gautama's lifetime all disputes and criticisms of conduct were brought to him for decision, and his decisions became the rules of the Order. Even rules which came into being after the founder's death were referred back to him as their originator, but there is apparently much contemporaneous material. Each rule is normally introduced by a story giving a short account of the incident which led to the framing of the rule in question. These stories give much insight into the life of the Community, and show how the monastic regulations gradually took shape, as the result of criticism, both by the world outside and by strict members inside the Order, of lax conduct on the part of weaker members. Twice monthly the Order met in solemn session to hear the list of offences referred to in the decisions recited, when offending members were required to confess their misdeeds, and obey the necessary ruling, in lieu of expulsion from the Order. This ceremony of atonement from offences gave rise to the name for this discipline literature of *Pātimokkha* or *Disburdenment*.

The present publication of *Pātimokkha* rules is also of great interest, because it gives the rules for the nuns. This translation, with the introductory stories and old commentary, appears for the first time, and provides a useful accompaniment to the translator's illuminating book *Women under Primitive Buddhism*, published in 1930.

Miss Horner is to be congratulated for this serviceable translation, the value of which is enhanced by an opening discussion of various problems and abundant footnotes.

F. HAROLD SMITH.

CHENIES.

Slavery and Freedom. By Nicholas Berdyaev. (Geoffrey Bles. 25s.

Berdyaev, as has been said, is one of the most important Christian thinkers of our time. Whatever, therefore, he writes must be read. This volume is of quite exceptional importance. It is not just a restatement of the ideas which he has already discussed in previous volumes. It is a clarification and a systematization of his profundity of thought, which so many readers have found to be obscure. I believe that, in this volume, Berdyaev has achieved philosophical and theological maturity. He has explored and co-ordinated the implications of his libertarianism. If only for this reason, this volume is outstanding among Berdyaev's books. But an additional interest in the book is the semi-biographical introduction, in which Berdyaev traces the development of his philosophy. His account of his Marxist associations is fascinating. He contended against leaders like Plekhanov and Lunacharsky that truth was a value independent of class . . . "truth does not serve anybody or anything; they serve it." Ultimately "I have grasped the very heart of the truth that every objectivization of the spirit in the world is the realm of the second-rate" (p. 18). Here is the theme of the book. "In it I write about man, the world and God, only such things as I have seen and lived through."

The core of Berdyaev's thought is freedom, which is primal, fundamental and absolute. It is not an idea or a relationship even, but an existence in the living, concrete being, man. From this he derives his doctrine of personality—a doctrine which he terms "personalism." Freedom, which is an existence in man, derives from Spirit, from Eternity, from God. Freedom is not of this world at all. What is both of and in the world, in cosmic and historical time, is determination, necessity. It is this tension between freedom (spirit) and necessity (nature) which constitutes the basic, fatal dualism of experience. "Personality is the victory of spirit over nature, of freedom over necessity." This is the key to the whole of Berdyaev's thinking. Freedom is reality. It is, as Berdyaev keeps on affirming in this book, existential, subjective. Not subjective as opposed to objective, but subjective as primary existence, from which subjective and objective (as opposites) are derived and, therefore, secondary. Only existential man is free, primary.

From this affirmation follows Berdyaev's whole thesis: that outward being, embodiment in matter, in institutions, *i.e.*, the whole of history, "objectivization," is partly illusion. It is a frustration and partial defeat of the primary reality of Spirit. In the process of objectifying, freedom turns into necessity, which man rationalizes as an illusion of freedom. "Freedom is the knowledge of necessity" (Hegel)—the most amazing instance of self-deception in the entire history of philosophy.

Berdyaev works out this thesis through a profound analysis of the social process and social institutions. History is a realm of slavery which oppresses man in all his social forms, relationships and ideas. Man is a slave to being, to God, to the race, the nation, the State, etc. The whole of historic existence acts upon man as a lure—the lure of war, of sex, of Utopia, of revolution, etc. In this whole argument,

Berdyaev reveals profound insights into the crisis of our own time. Totalitarianism, *e.g.*, whether Left or Right, is what the State must become, the transformation of itself into Church.

The distinctive contribution of Berdyaev to theology is in the field of eschatology, in which alone he sees the liberation of man. He formulates his doctrine of eschatology within the framework of a metaphysical theory of time, which is threefold—cosmic time, symbolized by the circle; historic time, symbolized by the straight line; and existential time, symbolized by the point. The end of history is its absorption into existential time.

It is all very profound and extraordinarily stimulating. But is it sound? Berdyaev lands himself in a denial of Providence (p. 248). In this he out-Barths Barth! But nothing can detract from the greatness of this book. It is Berdyaev at his finest and noblest. This is a book, not to borrow, but to buy; a book to be re-read and pondered.

D. R. Davies.

Dulwich.

The Friendship of Christ: A Devotional Study. The Bishop of London's Lent Book, 1945. By Charles Smyth. Longmans, Green and Co. 2s. 6d.

A hasty reader who wants quick returns for little pains will find this a disappointing book, and so will anyone who confuses devotion with emotion. But anybody who is prepared to be realistic and to do some hard thinking will find himself amply repaid. In barest outline, the plan of the book is straightforward. Starting from an analysis of friendship on the human level as disinterested, costly, and disciplined, and as involving three elements—the material or external, the intellectual, and the moral—it moves on to examine the friendship of Christ, first in general and then as illustrated in some of His particular friendships depicted in the Gospels. The chief conclusions are that the friendship of Christ is God-centred and that, in distinction from merely human friendships, it is a one-direction friendship, involving (of course) a wholehearted response, but not a response on equal terms. A concluding chapter draws three practical deductions: the friendship of Christ, guaranteed as real by the Scriptures and by experience, can best be entered into by the discipline of careful and painstaking prayer, through the Eucharist, and in the fellowship of the Church.

The writer's purpose is to help the sort of reader who is already a mature and practising Christian but who has difficulty in entering into the experience of our Lord as a real person; and one of the things which commend him is his realistic facing of the difficulties. Prayer for example may be "colloquy," but, if so, it is of a very special sort, and it takes some training to discern God's side of it. Again, the Jesus of history is a glorious example, but to admire the example is not the same thing as experiencing the living Christ. This is nothing if not an honest and a thoughtful book. If there is a criticism to make, it is, perhaps, that Canon Smyth, in a supersensitive fear of emotionalism and individualism, tends to be

rather negative in his emphasis. So much time is taken up in warnings against treating the friendship of Christ as though it were merely on a level with human friendship, or approaching it in an individualistic or undisciplined spirit, that—although the conclusions are really constructive—they may appear a trifle meagre.

But the refusal to pander to the emotions or to indulge in wishful thinking is utterly salutary, and it may well be that any initial disappointment will yield, on closer acquaintance, to increasing gratitude. It is likely that this book, which (to its writer's own modest surprise) is largely a pioneer in the field, will prove to be not merely one of the most scholarly and distinguished of its series but an authority to be reckoned with by every subsequent writer. That is why it is a good thing that the erudite author has documented it so elaborately, whatever the ordinary reader may think of the formidable apparatus of brackets, footnotes, inverted commas, and italics. The pity is that devotional literature is not always so thorough and scholarly.

Even if the main theme had not been handled in so firm and distinctive a manner, there are plenty of interesting and remarkable *obiter dicta* which, even by themselves, would make us ready to forgive the one or two lapses into a political or religious partisanship which, in the main, is honourably held in check.

It is regrettable that this distinguished book could not be more attractively printed and bound.

C. F. D. Moule.

Clare College,
Cambridge.

Original Order and Chapters of St John's Gospel. By F. R. Hoare. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 10s. 6d.

Many critics and expositors have felt baffled by the sequence of thought and order of events in the Fourth Gospel, and many rearrangements of the traditional order have been proposed. But few can have devoted so many years of painstaking research to the subject and a whole book exclusively to its treatment as Mr Hoare has done.

Any attempt to summarize his conclusions and the arguments by which they are reached will inevitably make them appear arbitrary and dogmatic. The whole argument is built up step by step, and each detail is indispensable to the whole. Nevertheless the attempt must be made, in order to lay bare what appears to be a fatal flaw in Mr Hoare's otherwise brilliant logic.

The argument marches cautiously yet triumphantly forward to the conclusion that the pages of the autograph of the Fourth Gospel became disarranged through some accident, possibly by being dropped on the floor. The original order was thus lost, the author apparently no longer available, and his literary executors left to restore the order as best they could. They looked, however, for external verbal connexions rather than for logical sequence of thought and event. Thus, *e.g.*, they joined xii, 34 to xii, 33 on account of the verbal link ὑψωθῶ (v. 32) and ὑψωθῆναι (v. 34), whereas xii, 34 really followed viii, 28.

In order to recover the original order Mr Hoare first concentrated upon the thought and the order of events. This showed that certain rearrangements were demanded. In order, however, to seek objective confirmation of the desired transpositions Mr Hoare set himself the task of rediscovering the pagination and chapter divisions of the autograph. This is the longest and most exacting part of the book. Having discovered the precise places where the pages of the autograph began and ended, Mr Hoare then has an objective guide as to where the present text may be broken in order to effect the desired replacements. Unhappily, however, there is no means of knowing how many Greek letters the original pages contained. In extant papyrus fragments the length of page or column varies within enormous limits. Therefore, Mr Hoare says, "The following estimates of the number and length of the columns must be understood to be reached by inductive reasoning which started from the more easily identifiable passages requiring to be transferred, and gradually evolved a formula applicable to all of them." No one would wish lightly to pull to pieces the patient work of many years, but this seems to be a fatal flaw in the whole scheme. The objective confirmation of the subjective argument cannot be established without first assuming, even though tentatively, the results of the subjective argument. Can such a basis really be called objective?

Mr Hoare would doubtless waive this objection aside with an appeal to the inherent probability of his reconstructed order, and it is to convince the reader of this that he prints in his reconstructed order the Gospel according to Saint John Chapters I-XVI from the Douai version. It reads attractively, especially in the Farewell Discourses, where there is considerable apparent improvement in the sequence of thought. It is unlikely, however, that Mr Hoare's reconstruction will become generally accepted. Perhaps a more liberal attitude on the part of the Roman authorities would enable Mr Hoare to divert his great abilities as a New Testament scholar into more profitable channels!

R. H. Fuller.

Ashbourne.

History of the Primitive Church. By J. Lebreton and J. Zeiller. Translated by E. C. Messenger. Vol. II. Burns and Oates. 18s.

This second volume by these well-known French Catholics is as excellent as their first. It shows all the open-mindedness of the historian who freely dismisses the legendary, however venerable, and concentrates upon facts which can be firmly established. The period dealt with is somewhat inaccurately described as from the death of St John to the end of the second century. In actual fact the great writers of the turn of the century, Irenæus and Tertullian, are not reached, nor are the great gnostics who preceded them. But one can detect a breadth of freedom in historical criticism due perhaps to the authors' passing beyond the N.T. period and therefore from the sphere of the Biblical Commission.

In the absence of any continuous narrative of the pre-Nicene period

in the original sources (Eusebius' history could hardly be dignified with this name) the treatment adopted is that of subjects, such as Christian Life at the End of the First Century, Propagation of Christianity, Persecution, the Apostolic Fathers, Ecclesiastical Organization, Christian Apologetics, etc. This treatment is careful, containing the statement of opposing views, which when considered erroneous or untenable are courteously refuted. The authors have a flair for extracting valuable information from the most tedious writers—*e.g.*, Hermas. Their summaries of the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers and of the Apologists, combined with copious (though not over-long) quotations should be of great value for the historian of Christian thought.

An Anglican naturally turns to such subjects as the origin of the ministry or the position of the Roman see. In the first case it is freely admitted that episcopoi and presbyters were at first identical and that episcopacy in the later sense arose from the exaltation of the chairman of the presbyteral college: at least such seems to be the solution of M. Zeiller on p. 400—but Fr Lebreton considers them both as simple priests; the Apostolic succession being carried on by Apostolic delegates such as Timothy or Titus till local monepiscopacy was established. But St Jerome's view of the Alexandrian succession is not quite fairly represented. For it seems incompatible with the idea of further consecration of a presbyter to be bishop, as he compares the appointment of such a one to the episcopate with an army making its own general or deacons choosing an archdeacon.

The position of the Roman Church in the second century, and indeed of St Peter in the New Testament, is stated with great moderation, though Ignatius is claimed by M. Zeiller as calling the Roman Church the president of the charity, or brotherhood, meaning the Church as a whole, while Fr Lebreton translates the same words as "presiding in love." He also points out that "one must not infer that his [Peter's] relations towards the other apostles were the same as those of the Pope towards other bishops"—a fact which an Anglican might wish that the successors of St Peter had more often remembered.

If this history is not to be compared with the great work of Duchesne as a piece of literature, it is undoubtedly most lucid, vigorous and arresting. No student of ancient Church history can afford to dispense with it.

H. Edward Symonds, C.R.

Mirfield.

The Lady of the Hare. A Study in the Healing Power of Dreams. By John Layard. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.

An ordinary case-history of an analysis on either Freudian or Jungian lines is almost impossible to publish in full because of its inordinate length and of the mass of apparently irrelevant material. The publishers are probably right in claiming that nothing so complete as this has been published before. In this particular instance the dream-material developed so rapidly and with such striking results that Dr Layard has found it practicable to give a very complete account of at least the first phase of a striking but typical case. The reader will gain most from it

if he does not try to criticize the steps of the discussion or the particular details of interpretation, but to enter with analyst and dreamer into the actual processes by which the development was brought about. These processes are not logical but progressive and constructive. In the second part of the book the particular archetype of the hare, which formed the vital feature in the dreams, is followed out into the realms of world-wide mythology. This too is an essential feature of Jung's method, drawing out by a sort of cumulative process the full range of significance of the archetypal patterns. The theological reader will be interested to find how constantly the symbolism points in the direction of familiar theological formulations, and the linking of the symbolic sacrifice of the hare with the *signum efficax* of the Eucharist is striking. The book may well prove to be of pioneer value in the field of the psychology of religion, though I do not think that its author would claim more for it than that it points to a path well worthy of more investigators and fuller investigation.

L. W. GRENSTED.

OXFORD.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE 1949 PRAYER BOOK

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I am grateful to Mr Bolton for his comments on my article, "The 1949 Prayer-Book"; though I think perhaps they may give a misleading impression to those who did not happen to see it. I doubt if his readers would gather that what I was advocating last August was not interference with any man's accustomed devotions, but merely a less restricted field of choice. All I submitted was that both the simpler type of Office (which Mr Bolton likes) and the enriched variety (which I and some others like) might enjoy equal legitimacy, instead of, as at present, only the simple form. Surely this is not taking anything away from anybody, but the contrary. It is a plea for a liturgical framework capable of expansion or contraction at will for the edification of its users. Is not the admission of this principle, in fact, implicit in your correspondent's own use of a form of Compline, notwithstanding its rejection by Cranmer?

Let me reassure Mr Bolton that I do not want to destroy our Offices, but only to fulfil them. There is nothing whatever in the 1949 Prayer Book that would interfere in the least with his present *modus orandi*—excepting the single admonition that, like St Peter, he should say his prayers at noon as well as in the morning and evening. I am sorry he feels that "this must be stoutly resisted."

I am, Sir,

Yours, etc.,

JOHN H. M. STANIFORTH.

FLIMWELL VICARAGE,
HAWKHURST, KENT.
March 22, 1945.

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher